Law of Torts — Practice

Question 1

Principle: Damnum sine injuria — actual loss without the violation of a legal right is not actionable.
Facts: A new grocery store lawfully opens next to B's shop and draws away many of B's customers, causing B a serious drop in income.
Can B claim damages?
(a) Yes, B lost income (b) No — B suffered loss but no legal right of his was violated (c) Yes, the new shop harmed his business (d) No, only because the shop is bigger

Accepted Answer

(b) No.

B suffered financial loss but no legal right of his was infringed — lawful competition is not a wrong. This is damnum sine injuria, which is not actionable.

Question 2

Principle: Injuria sine damno — the violation of a legal right is actionable even if no actual loss results.
Facts: A returning officer wrongfully refuses to accept X's valid vote. The candidate X wanted to vote for wins the election anyway.
Can X sue?
(a) No, his candidate won so there was no loss (b) Yes — his legal right to vote was violated, even without loss (c) No, voting is not a legal right (d) Yes, only if his candidate had lost

Accepted Answer

(b) Yes.

X's legal right to vote was violated. Under injuria sine damno the violation itself is actionable, whether or not any loss followed.

Question 3

Principle: A person is liable in negligence only if he breached a duty of reasonable care and that breach caused the harm.
Facts: D drives within the speed limit, keeping a proper lookout. A child suddenly darts onto the road from behind a parked truck and D, despite braking at once, cannot avoid hitting him.
Is D liable in negligence?
(a) Yes, the child was injured (b) No — D took reasonable care, so there was no breach of duty (c) Yes, drivers are always liable for hitting pedestrians (d) No, only because the child was at fault

Accepted Answer

(b) No.

D exercised the reasonable care expected of a prudent driver, so there was no breach of duty. Without a breach, negligence is not made out, even though harm occurred.

Question 4

Principle: Res ipsa loquitur — where an accident is of a kind that does not ordinarily happen without negligence, negligence is presumed and the defendant must disprove it.
Facts: After an operation, a pair of surgical scissors is found left inside the patient's body.
What follows?
(a) The patient must prove exactly how the surgeon was careless (b) Negligence is presumed and the surgeon must show he was not negligent (c) No claim, because operations are risky (d) The hospital, not the surgeon, is automatically liable

Accepted Answer

(b) Negligence is presumed.

Scissors left inside a patient could not ordinarily happen without negligence, so res ipsa loquitur applies: the burden shifts to the surgeon to prove he was not negligent.

Question 5

Principle: Trespass to land — unlawful entry onto another's land — is actionable per se, that is, without any proof of damage.
Facts: A walks across B's fenced field as a shortcut, being careful to damage nothing.
Is A liable for trespass?
(a) No, he caused no damage (b) Yes — trespass to land is actionable even without damage (c) No, because it was only a shortcut (d) Yes, only if B saw him do it

Accepted Answer

(b) Yes.

Trespass to land is actionable per se. The unlawful entry itself is the wrong; A is liable even though he caused no damage.

Question 6

Principle: Assault is an act that causes a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful contact; battery is the actual application of unlawful force.
Facts: In anger, X raises his fist and lunges at Y as if to strike him, but stops just short and never touches Y, who flinches in fear.
Which wrong, if any, has X committed?
(a) Battery, because he lunged (b) Assault, because Y reasonably apprehended imminent contact but was not touched (c) Both assault and battery (d) Neither, because no contact occurred

Accepted Answer

(b) Assault.

Y reasonably apprehended imminent harmful contact, which is assault. Since X never actually touched Y, there was no battery.

Question 7

Principle: An enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity is absolutely liable for any harm resulting from an escape of the dangerous thing, and no exception (including act of God) is available.
Facts: A factory storing highly toxic gas suffers a leak triggered by an unusually severe earthquake, injuring nearby residents.
Is the factory liable?
(a) No, the earthquake was an act of God (b) Yes — absolute liability admits no defence, including act of God (c) No, because the leak was not the factory's fault (d) Yes, but only for half the damage

Accepted Answer

(b) Yes.

Storing toxic gas is a hazardous activity, so absolute liability applies. It admits no exceptions, so the 'act of God' defence is unavailable and the factory is fully liable.

Question 8

Principle: Under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, a person who keeps a dangerous thing on his land is strictly liable if it escapes and causes harm — but the act of a stranger over whom he has no control is a valid defence.
Facts: D lawfully keeps a large water reservoir on his land. A trespassing stranger secretly sabotages the outlet at night; the reservoir bursts and floods a neighbour's farm.
Is D liable?
(a) Yes, the water came from his land (b) No — the escape was caused by the act of a stranger, a recognised defence (c) Yes, strict liability has no defences (d) No, only because the reservoir was lawful

Accepted Answer

(b) No.

This is ordinary strict liability under Rylands v Fletcher, which allows an 'act of a stranger' defence. Since a stranger's sabotage caused the escape, D is not liable. (Option (c) wrongly treats strict liability as absolute.)

Question 9

Principle: An employer is vicariously liable for a servant's tort only if it was committed in the course of employment; a substantial personal detour ('a frolic of his own') falls outside it.
Facts: A company driver, instead of taking the delivery route, drives 30 km the opposite way to visit a friend and, on that personal detour, negligently injures a pedestrian.
Is the employer liable?
(a) Yes, it happened during working hours (b) No — the driver was on a personal frolic outside the course of employment (c) Yes, employers are always liable for their drivers (d) No, only because the pedestrian was careless

Accepted Answer

(b) No.

The 30 km detour to visit a friend was a substantial personal frolic, outside the course of employment. The employer is therefore not vicariously liable, even though it happened during work hours.

Practice — Law of Torts

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