Election and Representation — Practice

Question 1

In a state assembly election, three parties contest 100 seats. Party A gets 40% of votes, Party B gets 35%, Party C gets 25%. Under FPTP (assume votes are evenly distributed), they win 55, 35, and 10 seats respectively. (a) Compare the actual seats won with what a PR system would give. (b) What problem does this reveal about FPTP? (c) Why did India still choose FPTP?

Accepted Answer

(a) **FPTP outcome vs PR outcome**:
- Party A: 40% votes → 55 seats (FPTP) vs 40 seats (PR). Gains 15 seats 'extra'
- Party B: 35% votes → 35 seats (FPTP) vs 35 seats (PR). Roughly proportional
- Party C: 25% votes → 10 seats (FPTP) vs 25 seats (PR). Loses 15 seats

(b) **Problem with FPTP — 'manufactured majority'**:
FPTP over-rewards the leading party and under-represents smaller parties. Party A gets 55% of seats despite only 40% of votes — a MAJORITY government with only 40% voter support. 60% of voters voted against the winning party, yet it has a majority. This can produce governments that do not reflect the true distribution of opinion. India's 2014 election: BJP won 52% seats with 31% votes.

(c) **Why India chose FPTP**:
(i) **Simplicity**: In 1950, ~80% of Indians were illiterate. Voters needed to understand the system and cast one vote for one candidate. PR systems (party lists, ranked voting) are more complex.
(ii) **Stable government**: PR leads to coalition governments — many small parties with proportional representation must negotiate. India needed strong, decisive governments in the difficult post-Partition years.
(iii) **Constituency link**: FPTP creates a direct link between ONE MP and a specific constituency. Voters know who their representative is. PR party lists weaken this geographic accountability.
(iv) **Large territory**: India's 543 constituencies in a single-member FPTP system are manageable; a national PR party list system would be complex to administer in such a vast, diverse country.

Question 2

Explain the composition and independence of the Election Commission of India. How does the Constitution ensure the ECI remains independent of the ruling government?

Accepted Answer

**Composition**:
The Election Commission of India (ECI) is a constitutional body under Article 324. It consists of:
(i) Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) — head of the body
(ii) Two Election Commissioners (since 1993 — expanded from sole CEC)
All three are appointed by the PRESIDENT on the ADVICE of the CABINET (effectively the Prime Minister). Critics argue this appointment mechanism reduces independence — ruling party influences who becomes CEC.

**Constitutional Safeguards for Independence**:

1. **Security of tenure**: Election Commissioners hold office for 6 years or until age 65, whichever is earlier. They CANNOT be removed by the President alone — the Constitution provides strong job security.

2. **Difficult removal of CEC**: The Chief Election Commissioner can only be removed through the SAME PROCESS AS A SUPREME COURT JUDGE — an address by both Houses of Parliament (special majority) followed by the President's order. This makes politically motivated removal practically impossible.

3. **Non-diminishable salary**: The CEC's salary cannot be reduced during service — preventing financial pressure from the government.

4. **Post-retirement restrictions**: ECI officers are conventionally not appointed to other government positions after retirement (preventing 'good behaviour for reward'). The Supreme Court has recommended this be made statutory.

**T.N. Seshan's precedent (1990–96)**: Seshan used Article 324's residuary powers (ECI has authority over ALL aspects of elections not covered by Parliament's laws) to enforce: spending limits, removing officials who violated election law, rescheduling elections in violence-prone areas. His assertiveness transformed ECI from a passive administrator to an active guardian of electoral integrity.

Question 3

Explain the system of reserved constituencies for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in India. Why was it adopted? What is the argument in favour of continuation, and what are the arguments for reviewing or ending reservation in legislatures?

Accepted Answer

**System of Reserved Constituencies**:
The Constitution (Articles 330–334) reserves a specific number of constituencies in the Lok Sabha and state assemblies for SC and ST candidates. In a reserved constituency: ALL voters vote, but ONLY SC (in SC-reserved) or ST (in ST-reserved) candidates can contest. The number of reserved seats is proportional to SC/ST population as a share of total population.

Current numbers (2024): Lok Sabha — 84 seats reserved for SC, 47 for ST (total 131 out of 543 = 24%).

**Why it was adopted**:
(i) Historical exclusion: For centuries, Dalits were excluded from political participation through caste discrimination, economic dependence on landlords, and social intimidation. Without reserved seats, their voices would be drowned out by upper-caste majorities in constituencies.
(ii) Power imbalance: A Dalit candidate contesting against upper-caste candidates in a mixed constituency faces social prejudice, economic threats (landlords, employers), and caste-block voting. Reserved seats give guaranteed entry.
(iii) Ambedkar's argument: Political representation is not just symbolic — it determines which issues get raised, which policies get funded. Without Dalit MPs in proportion to population, Dalit concerns (land, wages, untouchability) would be systematically ignored.
(iv) Temporary but renewable: The Constitution originally envisioned reservation for 10 years (until 1960), renewed by Parliament repeatedly. It reflects the recognition that formal equality is insufficient without structural support.

**Arguments for continuation**:
(i) Caste discrimination persists: NCRB data shows 50,000+ atrocities against SCs and STs per year (2022). Until social discrimination ends, political reservation remains necessary.
(ii) Representation still inadequate: Even with reservation, SC/ST representation in UPPER HOUSES (Rajya Sabha), CABINETS, and BUREAUCRACY is not proportional.
(iii) Economic power still concentrated: Without reservation, economic dominance of upper castes would translate into political dominance through electoral financing and media control.

**Arguments for reviewing/ending**:
(i) Creamy layer: Reservation benefits disproportionately accrue to the 'advanced' sections within SC/ST who are already economically better off. True disadvantage lies with the most marginalised.
(ii) Permanent dependency: Some argue reservation creates a political class that depends on reserved seats rather than building cross-caste coalition support, reducing pressure for genuine social change.
(iii) Does it reduce discrimination? Critics argue 70+ years of reservation has not eliminated caste discrimination — addressing underlying causes (education, economic empowerment, social attitudes) may be more effective.

**Conclusion**: Reserved seats remain necessary and constitutionally supported as long as caste discrimination persists in Indian society. The system should be reviewed not to end it, but to ensure it reaches the MOST MARGINALISED within SC/ST communities, not just the better-off sections.

Practice — Election and Representation

Sign in to save attempts to your dashboard and track your accuracy over time

Find a verified tutor

Join a live course

Browse coaching centres

About

Categories

Support

Documentation

Get Study Tips & Updates

Download Our App

Download for iOS

Download for Android

Popular Cities